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Abstract 
Why does free riding not escalate in the universal Nordic welfare state? How is it possible to 
maintain such a cooperative equilibrium where most people tend to cooperate? Our model 
suggests that the “missing link” is the accumulated stock of cooperation norms in terms of social 
trust. Arguably, a sufficient number of norm enforcers facilitate this unique collective insurance 
system. 
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1. Introduction 
In the following, we want to focus on the survival of the universal Scandinavian welfare state. 
How is it possible to maintain such a good equilibrium where most people tend to cooperate 
rather than free ride? Thus, our main research question is: Why does free riding not escalate and 
destroy the Scandinavian welfare state? 
 The backbone of the universal Nordic welfare model is the state as a dominant supplier 
of social services. Benefits tend to be defined at the individual level but with differences 
depending on the individual’s labor market history. The main financial sources are various forms 
of taxes (Andersen, 2004). Overall, the universal Nordic welfare model provides adequate 
benefits for (almost) the entire population such as pension system, child allowances, home help, 
student allowance, education, unemployment benefits, early retirement benefits etc. As stated by 
Fong, Bowles and Gintis (2003) the modern welfare state is a remarkable human achievement 
where a substantial fraction of total income is regularly transferred from the better off to the 
worse off. Furthermore, publics regularly endorse the governments that preside over these 
transfers. 
 When the defining aspect of the universal welfare model is the fact that access to welfare 
arrangements is an individual right, then there is no direct linkage between entitlements and 
financing at the individual level: “Any insurance contract has moral hazard problems if the 
insurance is against contingencies that can be affected by the insured. In this respect, the attitudes 
and norms associated with receiving social assistance play a key role” (Andersen, 2004:751).  
Hence, the insurance system only works if a strong norm prevents free riding. Andersen 
continues that: “Norms may change over time”, which “… can lead to rapid changes in the scope 
for welfare policies by leading to unsustainable combinations of transfer levels and taxes.” In fact, 
the “Change in norm may be an inherent consequence of the way in which the welfare system is 
organized” (Andersen, 2004:752). 
The likelihood of a change in fundamental welfare norms is increased by the presence of 
the so-called “Samaritan’s Dilemma”. Three decades ago, James Buchanan (1975) argued that the 
altruism and the charity of the rich could induce the poor to act in socially sub-optimal ways to 
take advantage of transfers from the rich. For example, a poor person will undersave and get a 
perverse incentive to stay helpless in the current period if he/she anticipates that a rich person 
will bail him/her out in the future.
2
  
If the fundamental welfare norm saying that everyone should contribute when capable is 
weakened over time, the Nordic welfare state would soon end up in a vicious circle where 
taxation of income eventually will reach 100 percent. People would stop trusting that other 
people in general contribute to the welfare state system if free riders are no longer stigmatized 
and minimized in number. Trusting that most people will contribute to the common pool of 
resources is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the provision of collective insurance 
systems and other collective goods. 
Concerning related literature, it has been discussed why the Nordic welfare system works 
(Bjørnskov and Svendsen, 2007). A gap exists. Bjørnskov (2005a), for example, has reviewed the 
literature and concludes that the direction of causality remains an open question. Rothstein 
(2003) suggests that the institutional quality of the welfare state is the main reason. The more 
universal, uncorrupted and impartial the institutions responsible for the implementation of laws 
and policies are, the better it works. In contrast, Uslaner (2006) emphasizes culture as the main 
                                                 
2 Amegashie and Kutsoati (2004), Coate (1995), Nannestad (2004), Green-Pedersen, Klitgaard and Nørgaard (2004: 
10). Buchanan (1975) considered the increasing economic affluence as one possible explanation for the pervasive 
importance of what he called the “Samaritan’s Dilemma” in twentieth century Western Society. Wealth makes it 
possible to choose “soft options”, such as “kindness for criminals”. 
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explanation and Putnam (1993) civic society, see Ostrom and Ahn (2009) for a comprehensive 
review of the literature 
One way to sustain cooperation and avoid escalating free riding in the universal welfare 
state is via the possibility of punishment. Even though several motives for cooperation exist, 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that the single most effective mechanism to achieve cooperation 
is through the ability to punish: when players are given the opportunity to punish free riders, 
stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. 
Moreover, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and Quervain et al. (2004) indicate that the 
possibility of punishment has a strong disciplining effect on free riders. This is, e.g., seen from 
comparing experiments on the ultimatum and dictator game. Rejection of positive offers in the 
ultimatum game is substantially lower when the game is altered so that rejection does not punish 
the proposer (Abbink et al., 2001). Moreover, offers generated by a computer rather than another 
person are significantly less likely to be rejected. This suggests that those who reject low offers at 
a cost to themselves are reacting to violations of fairness norms rather than simply rejecting 
disadvantageous offers. 
When adding a second round to the prisoner’s dilemma game where punishment is 
possible, cooperation also is sustained.3 Experiments suggest that (some) individuals actually 
punish even though it is costly for themselves. This type of player is denoted “willing punishers” 
by Ostrom (2000). When punishment is also costly for the punisher, punishment will, however, 
only be executed when the punisher receives utility from punishing. Experiments by Quervain et 
al. (2004) on a trust game show that individuals derive “utility” from punishing norm violators. 
This enrichment of types of preferences gives a more realistic description of reality when adding 
the existence of both conditional cooperators and willing punishers. Such insight eventually adds 
to the understanding of how different societies come around.  
Moving from individual preferences to interpersonal norms, a basic definition of a social 
norm is given as a behavioral regulatory based on socially shared beliefs of how to behave and 
how and when to punish deviators by informal social sanctions (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).  
The emergence of such norms can be analyzed by evolutionary game theory, where the 
different types of preferences compete against each other. Here the assumption is that a social 
norm emerges when a sufficient fraction of the total population is of the same type. According to 
Kolstad (2003), when persons meet in an evolutionary game setting and play e.g. a prisoner’s 
dilemma against each other, the players with highest payoff have a higher reproduction rate. In 
this setting, and given a population consisting of cooperators (people who always cooperate) and 
rational egoists (homo economicus), the cooperators will be defeated by rational egoists when 
different persons are matched randomly.  
We show below that in a prisoner’s dilemma game, cooperators can only survive (and 
even expand) if they can identify the type of the other players and then choose who to play 
against (so-called assortative matching) and if it is not totally possible to identify types then have 
an effective punishment available. Such a strategy is only possible if the cooperators are also 
willing to punish.4 Together, this builds up social norms for cooperation either through an 
evolutionary process or through learned behavior. 
After establishing that a norm of cooperation can be sustained in a group, the last step is 
to explain the move from this to emergence and sustainability of a welfare state. Here, we argue 
that social trust is the mechanism that can generate a welfare state. Social trust simply implies that 
when you meet a stranger, the stranger will reciprocate and thus facilitate the emergence of 
mutual trust. In other words, trust is defined as the subjective beliefs of an individual when 
he/she is playing cooperation that a stranger will respond by playing cooperation too. Thus, 
                                                 
3 Experiments verify that many people are willing to use costly punishment against defectors, see e.g. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) and Abbink et al. (2001). 
4 Since punishment is costly, e.g., Trivers (1971) proposes that the emergence of feelings like guilt and shame gives 
an evolutionary advantage, which could give another explanation for the emergence of “conditional cooperators”. 
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mutual trust implies that when playing with a stranger, the belief exists that the stranger is also a 
conditional cooperator. 
Thus, our main finding is to suggest that the “missing link” in explaining this empirical 
puzzle could be the accumulated stock of social trust. This contribution is in line with Fehr and 
Gächter (2000). They argue that there is reason to believe that social norms are relevant for the 
amount of tax evasion and the abuse of welfare payments, and for attitudes towards the welfare 
state in general. Furthermore, they argue that: “In view of the powerful implications of 
reciprocity, it is also important to know why a sizeable fraction of the people has reciprocal 
inclinations. Which factors in the evolution of the human species have contributed to this?” 
(Fehr and Gächter, 2000:21).  
The role of social trust in relation to the welfare state has, to our knowledge, not been 
modeled yet. This paper attempts to fill this gap. Almost all economic models assume that all 
people are exclusively pursuing their material self-interest and do not care about “social” goals 
per se. As e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) state, this may be true for some (perhaps for many) 
people, but it is certainly not true for everybody. Experimental evidence shows that the 
traditional, selfish model is too limited (Schram, 2000). Crucial to the analysis of the appearance 
and sustainability of the welfare state is how to explain why players contribute to a welfare state 
as they essentially face incentives similar to the incentives present in a prisoner’s dilemma game. 
In order to explain why the Nordic welfare state works, we first introduce the concept of 
social trust. Second, we present a theoretical model concerning the reciprocity among agents that 
underlies the remarkable level of cooperation among strangers observed in the Nordic welfare 
state. Finally, we give a conclusion. 
2. Social Trust 
Social trust makes it easier to cooperate, for example a person’s willingness to cooperate in a one-
shot prisoner’s dilemma game (Poulsen and Svendsen, 2005). As such, the presence of social trust 
determines how easily people who do not know each other can work together whereby 
transaction costs are lowered. Informal self-enforcement of contracts is now possible without 
third party enforcement.5 A firm, for example, would lower its transaction costs by having 
numerous informal, i.e. not formally sanctioned, transactions taking place (see Coase, 1937). It is 
not necessary to monitor and enforce all transactions. In other words, more social trust in a 
country will, for example, make it easier for a citizen to do a transaction, do a trade, find a job, 
get access to resources etc. 
Social trust may differ in different countries. For example, an early writer like Adam 
Smith (1997 [1766]) observed notable differences in trust across nations and found that the 
Dutch “are most faithful to their word”. John Stuart Mill (1848) wrote: “There are countries in 
Europe … where the most serious impediment to conducting business concerns on a large scale, 
is the rarity of persons who are supposed fit to be trusted with the receipt and expenditure of 
large sums of money” (cited from Zak and Knack, 2001). Such differences in the level of social 
trust across countries survive today. 
Fukuyama (1995:153) has defined trust in the following way: “Trust arises when a 
community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular 
and honest behavior.” Social trust can then be defined as the expectation that a stranger will 
follow the norm in question. In other words, social trust is the expectation that a stranger will not 
                                                 
5 These transaction costs will always be positive when the agents do not possess full information. In order to support 
the exchange of goods and services in a world with incomplete information, the agents need to construct “rules of 
the game”, i.e. institutions (North, 1990). These institutions can both be formal (rules written down) and informal 
(rules not written down) and both types matter to economic growth (cf. Schjødt and Svendsen, 2002). Oliver 
Williamson (1975), among others, has emphasized the role of formal institutions in reducing “transaction costs”. 
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break the norm in question and cheat you even if there may be a private net gain from doing so. 
Social trust basically reflects the likelihood of being cheated. 
The norm itself defines what action is right or wrong. Coleman writes that: “… a norm 
may prescribe certain actions, such as the norm that an athlete on a team should play his best.” 
One could, for example, argue that the “work norm” in the primitive tribe would be to kill a 
mammoth or to gather many berries, whereas the welfare society prescribes that people, when 
capable, should get a job and contribute to the common pool of tax revenues from which welfare 
services are financed. Coleman continues: “It follows that if the person whose action is at issue 
acts in accord with the norm, he acts in a way that may be less to his immediate interest than if he 
disregarded the norm. For if this were not so, then his own choice, in the absence of the norm, 
would lead to the same action and the norm would be superfluous” (Coleman, [1987] 2003:138).  
In line with Coleman (1988), Fehr and Gächter (2000) define a social norm as: 1) a 
behavioral regularity; 2) that is based on a socially shared belief of how one ought to behave; 3) 
which triggers the enforcement of the prescribed behavior by informal social sanctions. Note that 
this definition is very broad and does not say that the moral code needs to have a justification in 
normative ethics. 
Ostrom (2000) defines social norms as shared understandings about actions that are 
obligatory, permitted or forbidden. Which norms are learned, however, varies from one culture 
to another, across families, and with exposure to diverse social norms expressed within various 
types of situations. The intrinsic cost that an individual incurs from failing to use a social norm, 
such as telling the truth or keeping a promise, is referred to as guilt if entirely self-inflicted, or as 
shame when others know about the failure.  
A norm defined as social trust enables us to model why the bumblebee actually flies in 
spite of strong free rider incentives in the four Nordic welfare states. Social trust is measured as 
the percentage of a population answering yes to the question “do you think that most people can 
be trusted, or can’t you be too careful?” 
This approach was pioneered by the team behind the World Values Survey (Inglehart et 
al., 2004) and originally developed by Rosenberg (1956). This measure is arguably a good 
indicator for what it is intended to measure (see Bjørnskov, 2005b for further discussions of the 
validity of this indicator). Even though social trust does vary over time, it is rather stable across 
individuals and especially across countries. The mean change in trust is only 0.28 over a decade 
(Uslaner, 2002:252). Both Volken (2002) and Bjørnskov (2005b) find that the social trust scores 
are stationary over time too. 
The social trust data in 86 countries are drawn from the four waves of the World Values 
Survey (Inglehart et al., 2004) and our ongoing Social Capital Project.6 The main result is that the 
four Nordic welfare states indeed stand out as countries with much more social trust than the rest 
of the world. Especially Denmark, Norway and Sweden are outstanding with more than 60 
percent of respondents trusting most people. Finland is fourth with 56 percent, closely followed 
by the Netherlands (confirming Adam Smith’s observation about the Dutch back in 1766). These 
high scores presumably make the countries’ economies run more smoothly and offer an 
explanation for the flight of the bumblebee. 
Below this leading group, we generally find other Western European countries followed 
by a mix of Asian, Eastern European, African and South American countries. Brazil, Philippines, 
Costa Rica and Uganda hit the bottom with scores below 10 percent. The average for the 86 
countries as a whole is 28 percent. Most notably, France (23 percent) and Portugal (16 percent) 
score low compared to their neighboring countries. In summary, the four Nordic welfare states 
top the list (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2010). Can they stay in this equilibrium? We try to give a 
theoretical answer to this question in the following section. 
 
                                                 
6 Both China and Iran are excluded throughout; they are strong outliers in the trust surveys performed so far, see 
Uslaner (2002) and Bjørnskov (2004). 
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3. Model 
The theoretical starting point is the classical result from a prisoner’s dilemma game that 
cooperative outcome will never prevail. Therefore, a transformation of the original game is 
needed to increase the likelihood that players cooperate. In the following, we follow Poulsen and 
Svendsen (2005) and view cooperators in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game as a proxy for 
social trust. 
Consequently, we propose two such transformations; both regarding changes in the 
underlying behavioral assumptions of the players. First we consider that players are willing to 
punish (norm violators) defectors, even though this is also costly for the punisher, and secondly, 
we redefine players as being identical to a strategy. In this latter case, the proportion of players 
(strategies) in a population will be defined as a norm. (If only one strategy survives, this will be 
the prevailing norm). 
As already discussed in the introduction, the possibility to punish is the single most 
important mechanism to achieve cooperation. We therefore present different ways of 
incorporating types of players who punish. This could be a situation where a defector is not 
totally certain about whether he/she might encounter a punishing player, or we could invoke an 
evolutionary approach where strategies compete and then analyze whether the presence of a 
punishing type will make the cooperators survive. Both approaches can explain the existence of 
cooperators and be interpreted to mean that the norm of cooperation survives.  
In the following, we set up a model that can explain the existence and persistence of a 
social norm of cooperation. We consider a type of player, called a cooperator, as a carrier of 
social trust. The share of such cooperators in a population describes the level of social trust. In 
order to do this, and in general to analyze the appearance and presence of social norms is by 
evolutionary game theory, which provides the tools to analyze which strategies, or patterns of 
behavior, emerge over time through a process of adaptation. The process of adaptation might 
reflect biological selection, or it might represent learning as agents switch to strategies that are 
observed to do better (Kolstad, 2003).  
Since social norms are patterns of behavior with certain characteristics, we can use 
evolutionary game theory to examine the conditions under which these particular patterns called 
social norms emerge. Most important for our purpose is that it focuses on the process of how a 
specific equilibrium emerges, through an evolutionary process.  
A common feature of the evolutionary models is that players are matched repeatedly to 
play a game, and a dynamic process describes how players adapt their behavior over time. In an 
evolutionary setting, players are modeled as non-strategic, following a pre-described rule 
(strategy). Stability is achieved if, given a population consisting of one strategy, no other strategy 
can invade the population and achieve a higher payoff than the present strategy. In this case, we 
have an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is based on two 
conditions: (1) an ESS x must earn at least as high payoffs against itself as any mutant strategy y 
against x; (2) if a mutant strategy y does as well against x as does x, then x must do strictly better 
against the mutant y than the mutant does against itself. Given a population of cooperators, 
consider the invasion of a defector. Condition (1) says that in order for the AC population to be 
stable against invaders, the payoff of AC playing against AC should be higher than AC playing 
against invaders, which is not true. So a small group of mutant defectors could invade a 
population of cooperators. Moreover, given that a population of defectors is stable against 
invasion of cooperators, since a cooperator does strictly worse against a defector than the 
defector does against itself, mutant cooperators cannot invade a population of defectors. As a 
consequence, a population that is randomly and repeatedly matched to play a one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma game thus ends up playing defect.  
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The strategies that survive can then be interpreted as a norm. If only defectors survive in a 
society, the prevailing norm in that society is defection. By applying the ESS to a prisoner’s 
dilemma, it is easily shown that defection is the unique ESS (see Figure 1).  
Assume as an example that the share    of strategy i will evolve according to the following 
replicator function:  
 
   
 
  
      
    
                                                                                         (1) 
 
 
Where  
  
 
     and       .   
       
 measures the average payoff for the population at time 
t. Let the players consist of “always cooperators” (AC) and “always defectors” (AD) and let the 
strategies be randomly paired to play the prisoner’s dilemma game (with restricted strategy 
spaces) from Table 1.  
 
Table 1: The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game 
Player 1\player 2 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) (4,4) (0,6) 
Defect (D) (6,0) (1,1) 
 
For the following examples, let    
    
          
    
        . 
             
It is easy to show that if a population of cooperators is invaded by defectors, the defectors will 
eliminate the cooperators, shown in Figure 1, where a population of AC is invaded by few AD. 
 
Figure 1: Invading defectors outcompete cooperators. 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 shows how a population of cooperators is outcompeted by a small number of invading 
defectors when players are randomly matched to play a prisoner’s dilemma game. 
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substantial fraction of total income is regularly transferred from the better off to the worse off. 
Furthermore, the public regularly supports the governments that are in charge of these transfers.7 
If we want to determine the stability of a welfare state in the framework of evolutionary 
game theory, that is, determine conditions where the persistence (survival) of cooperators is 
possible in the presence of defecting types (free riders), we need to be able to propose 
transformation of the original game such that cooperators can survive invading defectors. Several 
extensions imply that cooperators can also survive in the long run from the benchmark model of 
Figure 1.  
First of all, things might change radically if it is somehow possible for players to identify 
the type of encounter and then select whom to play against, which is called assortative matching. 
If it is possible for a cooperator to at least partially identify other cooperators, e.g., due to 
unconscious facial expressions, then cooperators might defeat invading defectors. Essentially, this 
amounts to saying that the probability that a cooperator meets another cooperator is higher than 
the share of cooperators in the population. Therefore, consider the following: Assume that the 
population share of cooperators is s, and let A be the probability that a cooperator meets another 
cooperator. (Assume further that we only are looking at a small part of the population, such that 
no matter the size of A, the defectors still face the same probability of meeting a cooperator or a 
defector).  Let the players play the prisoner’s dilemma game from Table 1. The expected payoffs 
to the two types are given by: 
 
 
                                               (2) 
                             (3) 
            
   
     
         (4) 
 
As an example, if      , then if      , cooperators receive higher payoff than defectors. 
Most importantly, in this model, both types will survive also in the long run. Consider that 
     , then when      , both types receive the same expected payoff, and the population is 
stable.  
The conclusion is that if matching is sufficiently assortative, cooperators, on average, do 
better than defectors, which means that a small segment of mutant cooperators can invade a 
population of defectors. In contrast, in this case, mutant defectors can invade a population of 
cooperators, but cannot eliminate the cooperators. We can thus substantiate the evolution of a 
cooperative norm when matching is assortative, and explain the presence of both types in 
equilibrium.8 Finally, the better cooperators can identify each other, the larger their share in a 
stable population.  
Bowles, Fong and Gintis (2006) provide an evolutionary argument for the emergence of a 
welfare state and the presence of strong reciprocal types. Their argument is that the presence of 
strong reciprocal behavior implies adherence to norms. If adherence to such norms implies a 
larger benefit to the group (like cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma) then the number (share) of 
strong reciprocal types is likely to increase.  
The obvious second extension, therefore, is to include a reciprocal type. To see how the 
possibility of encountering a “non-strategic” player might change the behavior of a selfish 
                                                 
7 According to an opinion poll from 2007, a majority of the voters in Denmark prefer more welfare to tax reduction. 
8 As Ostrom (2000: 149) puts it: “If a small core group of users identify each other, then they can begin a process of 
cooperation without having to devise a full-blown organisation with all the rules that they eventually need to sustain 
cooperation over time.” In small groups with many encounters, a high level of assortative matching is possible, e.g. 
voluntary dairy movements and voluntary associations (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004).  
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rational player, assume that a percentage of the population is what can be called a “reciprocal 
punisher” (RP).9 If such types observe defection by other players, they play punish, no matter the 
personal costs. Moreover, they are fully reciprocal in nature, such that if they observe 
cooperation, they also cooperate. What does this imply for cooperation? Denote by   
  a rational 
player’s expected likelihood of encountering a reciprocal punisher. Assume that encountering 
such a player is totally random, such that it is not possible to infer the type of the other player in 
advance. If a player defects against an RP type, then the outcome of this encounter is the payoff 
 . Define by           the expected payoff for player i, from playing the strategy   , when the 
probability of meeting a reciprocal punisher is   
  and the probability of meeting a rational player 
(= one that always defects in a prisoner’s dilemma) is      
  . We have that:  
 
           
         
         
         (5) 
 
           
         
         
           (6)    
 
                    
  
 
   
         (7) 
 
The higher the punishment or the greater the likelihood of encountering a reciprocal punisher, 
the more likely a player is to cooperate.  
The implication here is that when the possibility of encountering a punisher exists, then 
otherwise selfish players will (under certain conditions) find it optimal to cooperate. It is 
worthwhile mentioning that altruistic punishment is costly, that is, although it must have a 
positive effect on cooperation, when called upon to punish, a reciprocal punisher will still punish. 
Therefore, if there were an “automatic understanding” that I should be cooperating, then this 
would yield an overall larger payoff. 
The next step is to introduce the RP type into a population consisting of AC and AD and 
see if this implies that cooperation (seen as a social norm) can be sustained. Indeed, the 
introduction of a reciprocal punisher (RP) into the prisoner’s dilemma might also change things 
considerably. Here, the RP-types are able to punish after observing the outcomes of the game. To 
convey the intuition, it is simply assumed that in the case of defection, this type invokes 
punishment costs of      (in the sense that both players in total receive –1 of the encounter). 
The (expected) payoffs to the three types of players are: 
 
  
     
       
       
    
        
(8) 
  
     
       
       
       
       
(9) 
  
     
       
          
    
       
(10) 
 
The presence of a sufficiently large share of RP-types implies that the payoff to the AD-types is 
lower on average than for the AC-types, which implies that the share of the AC-types increases. 
                                                 
9 This term is found in Ostrom (2000); other authors call this type of player an altrusic punisher. Note that the type 
reciprocal punisher (RP) resembles the famous Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy, which turned out to be very successful in 
Axelrod (1980, 1984) tournaments. Bendor and Swistak (1995) argue that cooperative behavior supported by these 
strategies is the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hardest to disrupt. The difference 
is that RP punishes more than TFT and has features of “self-punishment”. Another difference is that in noise 
environments, situations without a one-to-one relationship between a move (strategy profile) and the resulting 
outcome due to some stochastic process, a strategy will perform better the more forgiving it is (Bendor, Kramer and 
Stout, 1991). See also Hoffmann (2000) for a thorough discussion of the robustness of Axelrod’s results. 
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The RP-types receive less than the AC-types, but more than the AD-types, eventually eliminating 
the AD-types and creating an increased share of AC-types. This logic is shown in Figure 2. 
The social norm of cooperation can be sustained against defectors if a sufficiently large 
number of reciprocal punishers are present, since such types punish the defectors, but reward the 
cooperators. In this way, these types act as an explicit punishment mechanism for the 
cooperators.  
 
Figure 2: The presences of PR-types eliminate the AD-types. 
 
Note: Initially:                    . Figure 2 shows how a population of defectors will be 
outcompeted if the share of reciprocal punishers is initially sufficiently high compared to the share of 
cooperators. 
 
However the evolutionary approach can also be used to show the fragility of the welfare system. 
Essentially, small changes in the initial distribution of the share of the types can, around certain 
threshold values, change the outcome totally. This is shown in Figure 3, where the initial shares 
of types are changed compared with Figure 2. Here, the AD-types eventually can invade and 
defeat a population consisting of AC and RP-types. As seen, however, it might take a long time. 
In fact, it takes 112 rounds before the share of the AD-types is above 5 percent suggesting that 
the population is fairly stable over a long period of time followed by a rapid growth in the share 
of AD-types. If the initial distribution of the RP-types is reduced only marginally compared to 
Figure 3, then the AD will not be able to invade this population. The result from comparing 
Figures 2 and 3 is that it takes a sufficient share of reciprocal punishers to guarantee the welfare 
state against invading defectors, i.e. norm violators that free ride. 
In perspective, certain points deserve to be emphasized. First, it is important to keep in 
mind that although the norm of cooperation survives, only some of these subjects are 
“reciprocators” who are prepared to reward friendly behavior and to punish unfriendly behavior 
even if this is costly to them. Second, whether or not appealing to reciprocal fairness works as 
enforcement device depends on the fraction of reciprocal types in the population and on the 
strategic situation in which the subjects interact. 
In a broader context, and combining the insight in this section, if the RP cannot identify 
the type they encounter then they will cooperate if they estimate that the probability of being 
cheated is sufficiently low (compared to an individual threshold level). Such estimates can be 
labeled trust. Therefore, if sufficiently many reciprocal players have sufficiently high trust, then 
the norm of cooperation can be sustained. If on the other hand, when either the number of RP 
diminishes, and/or the number of AD increases (as seen in Figure 3), the level of trust in the 
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population diminishes, and at a certain level the population hits a tipping point and reaches a low 
trust outcome.10  
 
Figure 3: The AD-types eventually eliminate the other types.  
 
Note: Initially:                          . Figure 3 shows how a population of cooperators 
will be outcompeted by defectors even in the presence of reciprocal punishers when the share of 
reciprocal punishers is low initially compared to the share of cooperators. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our starting point was the empirical puzzle of why free riding does not escalate in the universal 
Nordic welfare states. We suggested that one possible explanation is the stock of social trust 
accumulated in the Nordic welfare states. Such an approach seemed relevant for the Nordic 
welfare states as they generally rely on the norm that people will work and contribute to the 
common pool of resources whenever possible rather than free ride and, e.g., stay dependent on 
social security transfers. Thus, we asked how it is possible to stay in a good equilibrium where 
most people tend to cooperate. 
Our model suggested that cooperation with strangers is possible if a high level of social 
trust has accumulated. The theoretical results in relation to cooperation based on social trust may 
be grouped into three main findings. First, different forms of cooperation exist in prisoner’s 
dilemma games, if preferences for fairness are present. Second, social punishments discipline 
potential defectors. If the share of punishers is high enough, the system can survive in the long 
run as in the Nordic welfare state. Our model showed that social trust can only survive in the 
presence of free riders (defectors) if there is sufficient willingness to use costly punishment in a 
punishment, that is willingness to sacrifice own material well being to punish norm violators (the 
reciprocal punishers). Overall, the theoretical model suggests that social trust may be one of the 
“missing links” in explaining the maintenance of the successful Nordic welfare state.  
In perspective, if social trust really matters, it is important to understand not only how it 
is maintained but also how it is accumulated. Further research may try to move one step further 
                                                 
10 Other types of strategies can be included. Ostrom (2000) assumes the existence of two types of “norm-using” 
players – “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers” – in addition to rational egoists. The conditional co-
operators as individuals are essential tit-for-tat players. They moreover tend to trust others and be trustworthy (and 
therefore exposed to exploitation by rational egoists) as long as a sufficient proportion of others who return trust is 
relatively high. 
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by attempting to trace the historical origins of social trust in the Nordic welfare state. Here, the 
direction of causality between the institutional setup and the observed level of social trust needs 
to be tested further through extensive and rigorous data analysis including time series analyses. 
Such insight will have wide-ranging implications. It can, for example, tell us how well-functioning 
welfare institutions from the Nordic welfare states may be successfully exported to developing 
countries that may wish to copy the universal welfare model. 
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